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Public Lands: 
Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?1 
 




The question in the title has been raised with some persistence over 
the past few decades, most recently by a defendant facing charges for 
the armed takeover of a National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon in 2016, 
and by ranchers whose livestock graze on public lands.2  To answer it,  
I dig deeply into the history of the public lands, going back to the  
very founding of the nation.  I seek to show that arguments for 
unconstitutionality reflect a defective understanding of U.S. legal and 
political history; an extremely selective, skewed reading of numerous 
Supreme Court decisions and federal statutes; a much too narrow view 
of how much governing authority states have over activities taking 
place on U.S. public lands; and even a misuse of the dictionary. 
At bottom, the claim that public lands are unconstitutional seeks to 
have the judiciary use the Constitution to determine how much (if any) 
land the United States may own in any state.  For the courts to take on 
that responsibility would be a breathtaking departure from more than 
225 years of practice where Congress has made that determination 
through the political process, and from more than 150 years of Supreme 
Court decisions deferring to Congress.  It would also be contrary to the 
Court’s often expressed reluctance to revisit settled public land law, 
upon which so many property transactions depend. 
 
How the Nation’s Founders Dealt with the Public Lands 
 
The public lands began when seven of the original states-to-be 
ceded to the new nation claims they held to so-called western lands 
across the Appalachian Mountains.  After that had been decided, the 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public 
Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (2018). 
 2. As used in this chapter, “public lands” refers to any lands to which the 
United States holds title. Congress has applied the term to different categories 
of land in different statutes—for example, sometimes including national forests 
and national parks, and sometimes not.  A broad definition is appropriate when 
considering constitutionality because the pertinent part of the Constitution (the 
so-called Property Clause) speaks broadly of “the territory and other property 
belonging to the United States.”  U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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U.S. Constitution was drafted and ratified.  Its Property Clause gives 
Congress “power to dispose of and make all needful rules and 
regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the 
United States.”3  The Constitution also contains an “Enclave Clause,” 
which gives the United States exclusive authority over the seat of the 
national government (the District of Columbia), and similar authority 
over “places purchased” with the consent of the pertinent state for 
military facilities and “other needful buildings.”4  This Clause has 
never had any significant impact on public-lands policymaking.  
 
Public-Land Policy Up to the Civil War 
 
In the late 1820s, a handful of members of Congress put forth an 
argument that the United States had a constitutional duty to give all 
public lands to the states.  It gained no traction.  Before 1845, Supreme 
Court decisions addressing public lands generally deferred to Congress.  
The most prominent was United States v. Gratiot5 in 1840, which 
unanimously upheld a congressional decision to keep lands in national 
ownership and allow minerals they contained to be developed through a 
leasing system. 
Then, in 1845, in Pollard v. Hagan,6 the Court applied a notion 
that new states were admitted on an “equal footing” with existing states 
to conclude that, because the original states owned the beds of 
submerged lands under navigable waters, newly admitted states 
automatically gained ownership of such lands.  (The idea of “equal 
footing” is not found in the Constitution, but appears in so-called 
enabling acts by which Congress admits new states to the Union.)  The 
majority opinion in Pollard was written by Justice John McKinley, 
who earlier, as a Senator from Alabama, had failed to persuade 
Congress to support giving all public lands to states.  McKinley’s 
opinion contained several grandiose, muddled obiter dicta that have in 
modern times become a mainstay of the argument that public lands are 
unconstitutional. 
McKinley’s puzzling pronouncements must be read against the 
fierce political debate then taking place about Congress’s authority to 
abolish slavery in the territories and while admitting new states. 
McKinley, a slaveholder whom constitutional historian Carl Swisher 
                                                 
 3. Id. The word “dispose” does not necessarily mean to transfer 
ownership.  See Leshy, supra note 1, at 506–07. 
 4. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 5. 39 U.S. 526 (1840). 
 6. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
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tactfully described as “no rebel against Southern institutions,”7 was 
writing in an era when justices typically did not circulate draft opinions 
to their colleagues, which meant, as historian G. Edward White has 
observed, that a majority opinion “usually represented only the view of 
one Justice,” giving it “diminished status” as precedent.8  McKinley’s 
sweeping dicta in Pollard were a portent of the Court’s infamous 1857 
pro-slavery decision Dred Scott v. Sandford.9  There it ruled, among 
other things, that the Constitution’s Property Clause had very limited 
application, a view the Court never countenanced afterward. 
 
The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Congress’s Power 
over Public Lands after the Civil War 
 
The eighteen leading Supreme Court decisions addressing the 
Property Clause since the Civil War have all upheld (mostly 
unanimously) congressional decisions setting public-land policy.  A 
number of these describe Congress’s power as “without limitations,”10 
and several involved congressional actions retaining ownership of large 
tracts of land inside states.11 
Over that same period, several Supreme Court decisions have 
substantially narrowed Pollard’s holding that new states automatically 
gain title to the beds of navigable waters upon admission to the 
Union.12  Today, Pollard is regarded merely as establishing a kind of 
common-law default rule, where states are presumed to own submerged 
lands under waters that were navigable when they became states, but 
only if the national government had not previously conveyed those 
lands to others or reserved them for national purposes.  
 
The Statehood Compact Theory 
 
An argument related to the one based on Pollard is that new states 
are entitled to public lands because the United States allegedly pledged, 
in the so-called “compacts” admitting them to the Union, to completely 
divest itself of all land it owned within their borders.  There are no facts 
                                                 
 7. CARL. B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD: 1836-64 at 532 (1974). 
 8. G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The 
Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1482–83 (2006). 
 9. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 10. Leshy, supra note 1, at 545–50. 
 11. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). 
 12. Id. at 551–53. 
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to support that Congress ever made such a pledge.  For example, 
nothing about the admission of Utah—currently the only state claiming 
that U.S. public lands may be unconstitutional—suggests this.  To the 
contrary, the terms in the Utah Enabling Act13 that address public lands, 
as well as contemporary actions by the national government and the 
state, make clear that Congress intended to reserve plenary U.S. 
authority over public lands in Utah after its admission into the Union.14  
(The relevant provisions of the Utah Enabling Act resemble those of all 
other states admitted to the Union starting with Ohio in 1803.) 
 
“Equal Footing” and “Equal Sovereignty” 
 
A handful of Supreme Court decisions like Coyle v. Smith15 
address the idea that Congress’s power is limited by the notion that new 
states are admitted on an “equal footing” with existing states or that, as 
the Court put it in 2013 in its controversial 5-4 decision in Shelby 
County v. Holder,16 all states have “equal sovereignty.”  Coyle and 
Shelby County had nothing to do with public lands; the former involved 
Congress’s fixing the location of a state’s capital in its Enabling Act, 
and the latter involved the “pre-clearance” provision of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.  In other decisions, the Court has stated that the 
“equal footing” notion applies to political rights and obligations but not 
to lands or other property.17 
If the “equal footing” idea were to be seen as inviting judicial 
inquiry about whether the presence of public lands in a state limits the 
state’s sovereign powers, the Court’s many decisions holding that states 
have considerable authority over activities carried out on public lands 
are instructive.  States can tax and apply many of their laws to such 
activities.18  Indeed, the default rule is that the police power of the state 
extends to public lands until Congress legislates otherwise.19  The 
amount of public land in a state is, therefore, not a particularly useful 
measure of the scope of that state’s sovereignty.  It is also relevant to 
such an inquiry that states derive some special benefits from the 
presence of public lands within their borders; for example, various 
                                                 
 13. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). 
 14. Leshy, supra note 1, at 554–57. 
 15. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 16. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 17. See, e.g., Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244–46 (1900). 
 18. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); 
see also Leshy, supra note 1, at 563–67. 
 19. See, e.g., Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918). 
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federal aid programs provide extra funds to states with larger amounts 




The claim that public lands are unconstitutional raises a number of 
other concerns.  Just how much public landholding in a state might 
violate the Constitution, given that U.S. public lands comprise from 
near zero to more than 80% of the land in any one state?  Is it relevant 
how those lands are managed, such as for recreation and preservation 
(e.g., national parks), or for forestry, mining, wildlife protection, or 
military purposes?  Does the claim reach only land that is permanently 
held in U.S. ownership, and if so, how can “permanence” be 
determined, given the fact that one Congress can generally not bind 
another?  What are the “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” that make this kind of constitutional claim justiciable?21  
Also, because the United States has, without objection, owned a good 
deal of land in many states since they were admitted into the Union 
more than a century ago, is the claim stale?  If a constitutional violation 
is found, what is the proper remedy—can the courts order Congress to 
enact a divestiture scheme? 
Further, states and others who seek the assistance of courts in 
divesting the United States of public lands have always had a tried-and-
true political remedy.  For example, after the Supreme Court ruled in 
the late 1940s that the United States, and not the coastal states, owned 
the submerged lands adjacent to the nation’s coasts,22 the coastal states 
persuaded Congress to enact the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, which 




For well over two centuries, the national political process has 
determined the nation’s policy toward its public lands.  An unbroken 
line of Supreme Court decisions since the Civil War has acknowledged 
how that process has led to large tracts of public lands being retained in 
national ownership and managed for broad public purposes, without 
casting any doubt on the national government’s constitutional authority 
to do just that.  
                                                 
 20. Leshy, supra note 1, at 567–68. 
 21. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
 23. Or three leagues, in the case of Texas and that portion of Florida 
bordering the Gulf of Mexico.  See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (2012). 
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The nation’s long experience with extensive public landholdings 
has created deeply held expectations built on this clear understanding 
that fundamental public land policy decisions are made through the 
political, and not the judicial, process.  Accepting arguments that the 
public lands are unconstitutional would, by overthrowing that 
understanding, unsettle those expectations.  If the judiciary were to 
assume responsibility for determining how much land the Constitution 
permits the national government to own in a state, the validity of 
thousands of federal laws could be thrown into doubt, calling into 
question hundreds of thousands if not millions of property transactions 
bottomed on those laws.  Rather than start down such a perilous path, 
the courts should simply follow the Supreme Court’s clear teachings, 
including its repeated admonition to be extremely reluctant to revisit 
settled public land law.24 
In short, the nation’s founders wisely gave Congress, not unelected 
federal judges, the responsibility to direct the future of the nation’s 
public lands.  It is practically certain the U.S. Supreme Court would 
agree if asked. 
Still, because the Constitution empowers Congress to turn public 
lands over to states or private interests if it so wishes, defenders of 
public lands should not be complacent.  Those lands will remain in 
U.S. ownership only if it continues to command the support of the 
American people.  Put a little differently, each new generation of 
Americans must decide for itself whether to support U.S. ownership of 
the public lands.  
                                                 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527-38 (1975); Leo 
Sheep v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1980). 
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Tax Law: 
The Rhetoric of Tax Loopholes1 
 
Heather M. Field 
 
Legislators, policymakers, academics, and other commentators call 
for action to close the tax loopholes that riddle the U.S. tax system.  
But what is a “tax loophole?”  Denouncers of tax loopholes actually 
have widely divergent views.  Using the same “tax loophole” term to 
denote dramatically different things impedes real communication about 
tax reform, tax policy, and perceived tax abuses, and allows speakers to 
sidestep responsibility for articulating their true concerns.  Thus, people 
criticizing loopholes (or the taxpayers who use them) often talk past 
each other and engage in the tax equivalent of schoolyard name-calling. 
Commentators have criticized the “loophole” rhetoric before.  
Most prominently, Professor Borris Bittker, in 1973, examined 
different types of loopholes in an effort to “rescue the federal income 
tax from the superheated rhetoric of its populist friends.”2  Yet loophole 
rhetoric has continued unabated, perhaps in part (though certainly not 
entirely) because of the focus on defining and describing tax loopholes.  
Rather than continuing that focus, I attempt to overcome the 
rhetoric by providing a strategy for translating tax-loophole rhetoric 
into meaningful tax-policy dialogue.  Specifically, I argue that any 
reference to a “tax loophole” can be understood by identifying the 
substantive policy critique implied by the term’s use and by identifying 
the party that is the target of the criticism.  Understanding any 
purported tax loophole using these two inquiries provides a more 
productive framing of whatever concern is implied by the “tax 
loophole” terminology.  
 
What do people mean when they refer to “tax loopholes?” 
 
Most commentators merely imply a definition of the term “tax 
loophole” from the context in which they use the term.  Although the 
term “tax loophole” generally carries a negative connotation, the 
implied definitions are otherwise often inconsistent.  
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Heather M. Field, A Taxonomy for 
Tax Loopholes, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2018). 
 2. Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax “Loopholes” and Political Rhetoric, 71 
MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1127 (1973). 
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Some suggest that tax loopholes are benefits that arise from 
ambiguities or omissions in statutory language, where a tax benefit 
complies with the literal language of the law but violates its spirit, or 
where a tax preference is otherwise inconsistent with congressional 
intent.  And some commentators imply that tax loopholes are merely 
unintended tax-planning opportunities devised by clever tax advisers.  
Others use the term “tax loophole” to refer to tax-reduction 
opportunities that are explicitly provided by Congress and used by 
taxpayers as Congress intended (e.g., deductions for home-mortgage 
interest, state and local taxes, and charitable contributions).  Some go 
further to include as a tax loophole any feature of the system that 
legally reduces tax, including preferential capital-gains rates and the 
“realization” requirement that enables assets to appreciate tax-free until 
disposition.  Still others focus on the beneficiaries, labeling as “tax 
loopholes” any tax benefits available to special-interest groups or the 
wealthy, tax benefits available to some groups and not others, or tax 
benefits provided to some taxpayers but not to the speaker.  Ultimately, 
whether something is a tax loophole is often merely a matter of 
viewpoint—a tax preference that the speaker does not like. 
 
How can “tax loophole” rhetoric be translated into a  
productive dialogue? 
 
Ultimately, trying to define the term “tax loophole” with precision 
is pointless because the term has no independent significance.  No tax 
penalties, reporting obligations, or other consequences arise under the 
law because someone classifies a tax preference as a loophole.  Thus, 
rather than debating about whether a tax preference warrants the 
“loophole” appellation, it is much more productive to ty to understand 
why a speaker judges the tax preference to be worthy of the pejorative 
“tax loophole” label. 
Any reference to a “tax loophole” can be translated into a more 
substantive policy conversation by asking two questions: What is the 
policy objection? And who is responsible for the problem?  Using 
academic, practitioner, and news articles, political speeches, television-
show transcripts, and other materials that use the term “tax loophole,” I 
catalogued common answers to these two questions. 
 
A. What is the policy critique? 
 
Implicit in many uses of the “tax loophole” terminology is a 
concern about loss of revenue.  When the policy concern is about 
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revenue, several substantive questions follow: What is the speaker’s 
baseline for determining that the purported loophole causes a revenue 
loss?  Why is that baseline the correct one from which the provision’s 
impact should be measured?  Are there good reasons to accept this 
revenue loss?  What would be done with the additional revenue 
collected if the purported loophole were closed? 
Fairness is also a common concern that motivates speakers to 
describe tax preferences as loopholes.  Of course, fairness can be an 
elusive concept that is difficult to define.  Thus, speakers should be 
specific about their fairness concerns: Which groups of taxpayers are 
being compared?  Who is benefiting from the tax loophole and who is 
not?  And why should the groups receive the same tax benefit (or not)? 
Sometimes, the concern underlying a purported “tax loophole” is 
distortion of taxpayer behavior; taxpayers will alter their economic 
decisions to benefit from the loophole, leading to misallocation of 
resources and adversely affecting economic growth.3  These implied 
economic-growth arguments are sometimes tied to the other actions 
(e.g., lowering tax rates across the board or investing in education or 
infrastructure) that could be taken to foster economic growth if the 
loophole is closed.  If the problem with a loophole is its impact on the 
economy, it is important to answer several questions: How does the tax 
preference distort behavior?  How does the distortion impede growth?  
And exactly what change would improve the economy and how? 
Another, somewhat less common, critique implied by the term “tax 
loophole” is about needless complexity that hinders both compliance 
and enforcement.  Again, this policy concern can be fleshed out: How 
does the loophole add complexity and thus compliance and 
enforcement challenges and costs?  Why is that complexity not justified 
by other policy benefits of the tax preference?  How would a change 
simplify tax law and reduce the adverse consequences caused by the 
loophole? 
Whatever the underlying policy concern, speakers should be 
explicit about the substantive critiques causing the speaker to label a 
particular tax benefit as a “loophole.”  
 
B. Who is the target of the criticism? 
 
In addition, the “tax loophole” terminology often casts blame on a 
particular party, faulting them for the existence or perpetuation of the 
                                                 
 3. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 12–13 
(2008). 
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loophole or condemning them for using or facilitating the use of the 
loophole. The blameworthy party should be explicitly identified. 
Congress is the most frequent target of speakers who criticize 
“loopholes.”  Congress is blamed for creating loopholes and for failing 
to close them. Some critics fault the individual members of Congress 
for being incompetent drafters, for exercising bad judgment, and even 
for selling out to special interests, misusing their position of trusts, or 
otherwise lacking character.  Other critics place more blame the 
imperfect lawmaking process, in which loopholes are created because 
of political compromise, public-choice problems, or the inherent 
difficulty in drafting rules.  Ultimately, given the range of ways 
Congress can be critiqued for loophole problems, speakers should be 
explicit about what they believe Congress has done to create or 
entrench the loophole, explain whether they blame the people or the 
process and why, and then articulate how Congress should respond. 
Tax loopholes are also sometimes blamed on members of the 
executive branch.  Presidents are faulted for lack of leadership in 
closing loopholes.  The Treasury Department is blamed for drafting 
regulations that create loopholes and failing to promulgate regulations 
that would close loopholes.  And the IRS is criticized for ineffective 
enforcement that allows loopholes to persist.  
In limited circumstances, courts are blamed for creating loopholes 
by interpreting the law too generously or for enabling loopholes to 
persist by failing to interpret the law in a way that takes legislative 
intent into account and overcomes clear drafting problems.  
Some of the most frequent targets of criticism in the “tax loophole” 
discourse are not government actors but the taxpayers themselves, their 
lobbyists, and their advisors.  Taxpayers, particularly rich and powerful 
taxpayers, are criticized for using their influence and campaign 
contributions to get tax loopholes inserted into or retained in the tax 
code.  Others condemn taxpayers who use loopholes because their use 
of loopholes adversely affects tax morale, creates perceptions of 
unfairness, undermines voluntary compliance, and otherwise causes the 
policy problems discussed above.  In addition, those who criticize 
taxpayers for using loopholes often do so to impugn the character or 
judgment of the taxpayer who uses the loophole, commonly in an effort 
to defeat that taxpayer in an election.  These critiques often use vitriolic 
language that conveys strong moral condemnation.  And tax-loophole 
critics also blame tax advisors, without whom taxpayers could not use 
the loopholes most effectively. 
Various parties can be blamed for tax loopholes, so speakers 
should be explicit about which party is being blamed and how that 
party’s actions contribute to the loophole.  Often, however, the party 
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that is the target of the loophole critique is not the party who is (or 
should be) expected to fix the problem.  For example, taxpayers are 
unlikely to stop using loopholes on their own.  Thus, when identifying 
the target of the tax loophole criticism, it is also important to identify 
whether that party or another should respond and how.  
 
What is the benefit of the “tax loophole” translation effort? 
 
References to “tax loopholes” can be translated into more 
substantive policy conversations by identifying the particular tax 
provision at issue, identifying the policy problems created by the 
loophole, and identifying the targets of criticism implied in the “tax 
loophole” label.  
 
A. Improving the tax-policy discourse. 
 
This approach provides any tax-loophole critic with a framework 
for more explicitly articulating their critique.  And when speakers 
persist with unexplained “tax loophole” rhetoric, the translation 
strategy helps listeners ask good questions to elicit the policy concerns 
and desired responses of someone who talks about loopholes.  This 
strategy for teasing out the substance behind any speaker’s use of the 
“tax loophole” label reveals information about the source of the 
speaker’s concern that the “loophole” label conceals, stimulates thought 
about meaningful policy issues that the “loophole” label inhibits, 
elevates logic and analysis over the “loophole” label’s appeals to 
emotion and rhetoric, enables listeners to assess the degree to which 
they agree with the speaker’s characterization of the purported 
“loophole,” and moves the “tax loophole” conversation beyond rhetoric 
to potential solutions.  As a result, the discourse can be made less 
superficial, more policy-oriented, and more actionable.  
Admittedly, political rhetoric—including even “tax loophole” 
rhetoric—can have value, for example, as a rallying cry around which 
coalitions can be built.  Further, “tax loophole” rhetoric is far from the 
only hurdle to bipartisan tax reform.  However, to advance meaningful 
conversations about tax policy, any “tax loophole” rhetoric should be 
backed up by thoughtful, substantive policy arguments, which are 
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B. Understanding societal perceptions about the tax system. 
 
Even if insights provided by the “tax loophole” translation effort 
are not used to improve the tax-policy discourse, the translation 
strategy still improves the ability to understand attitudes toward 
taxation more broadly.  Specifically, the translation strategy can be 
used, in the aggregate, to better understand groups of people and how 
they perceive the tax system.  
To illustrate, I applied this approach to the tax-loophole discourse 
in the transcripts from two television-news media (CNN and Fox) and 
in articles from two print-news media (Wall Street Journal and New 
York Times) during the 2016 presidential campaign.4  I searched these 
four sources for “tax! /3 loophole!” for the period between June 8, 
2015, and November 8, 2016.  For each result, I used the context and 
language surrounding each tax-loophole reference to code it by the 
normative policy concerns that were suggested in the remarks and by 
the party (or parties) the remarks implicitly blamed for the tax-loophole 
problem.  The application of the translation strategy to the “tax 
loophole” discourse leading up to the 2016 election reveals stark 
differences in the focus of different media sources.  
Briefly, print media raised revenue concerns much more frequently 
than television media when discussing tax loopholes.  And, when 
discussing tax loopholes, the more left-leaning media emphasized 
fairness concerns with relatively little attention to economic concerns, 
whereas the right-leaning media placed much heavier emphasis on 
economic concerns.  This result is not surprising given analyses of 
voter concerns in the 2016 presidential campaign, which suggested that 
many Trump voters voted based on economic considerations and many 
Clinton voters were more motivated by concerns about inequality.5  
This analysis of the tax-loophole discourse, however, adds to our 
understanding of the presidential election because it provides evidence 
                                                 
 4. These sources were selected based on the Pew Research Center’s 2014 
study about political polarization in the media and the Pew Research Center’s 
2017 report about media news sources used leading up to the 2016 presidential 
election.  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, POLITICAL POLARIZATION & MEDIA HABITS: 
FROM FOX NEWS TO FACEBOOK, HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES KEEP UP 
WITH POLITICS at 3–4 (Oct. 21, 2014); PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TRUMP, 
CLINTON VOTERS DIVIDED IN THEIR MAIN SOURCE FOR ELECTION NEWS at 3–4 
(Jan. 18, 2017).  I sought to use the most widely used news sources that 
appealed to a voters at different places on the ideological spectrum. 
 5. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, What So Many People Don’t Get About 
the U.S. Working Class, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 10, 2016). 
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of the very different news media experiences that voters of different 
ideological perspectives may have had leading up to the election.  
These divergent media narratives about tax loopholes may have 
influenced, or at least reinforced, voter preferences about which policy 
issues matter the most, and thus may have contributed to our 
increasingly polarized discourse about government and politics in the 
United States. 
The media sources diverged less on the issue of which party was 
responsible for loopholes.  Among results where a responsible party 
was identifiable,6 a majority placed significant blame on taxpayers, 
with Congress being the second-most frequent target of criticism.  
Many articles that blamed taxpayers for using loopholes, however, 
implied that some other, usually unnamed, party was expected to fix the 
problem.  Although commentators were often unclear about which 
party they believed should fix the tax-loophole problem, insights into 
the perceived source of the problem provide an important step toward 
finding solutions. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Ultimately, this article provides a strategy for cutting through the 
“tax loophole” rhetoric and revealing the substance and source of the 
underlying concerns.  Ideally, this strategy can overcome the empty 
“loophole” language, advance more policy-based and actionable 
discourse, and reveal larger political narratives, helping us to learn 
something about U.S. society and about how different groups perceive 










                                                 
 6. A responsible party could not be determined for a significant minority 
of the search results (22% of the New York Times search results, 25% of the 
Wall Street Journal results, and 37% of the CNN and Fox News results). 
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